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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING: LESSONS 






Canada has recently witnessed dramatic changes in end of life law and policy. Most notably, 
we have moved from a prohibitive to a permissive regime with respect to medical assistance in 
dying (MAiD). As a number of Australian states are actively engaged in debates about whether 
to decriminalise MAiD,1 it is worth reviewing the Canadian experience and drawing out any 
lessons that might usefully inform the current processes in Australia. 
 
II MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING IN CANADA (VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED 
SUICIDE)2 
 
A  The Past 
 
Until 2016, assisted suicide was clearly illegal in Canada. It was an offence under s 241(b) of 
Canada’s Criminal Code.3 Euthanasia was also clearly illegal in Canada—it was murder under 
the Criminal Code.4 In the early 1990s, Sue Rodriguez, a woman with amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS, a degenerative neurological condition), challenged the prohibitions under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘Charter’),5 but was unsuccessful at the Supreme 
Court of Canada (by the merest 5–4 margin).6 Over the years, there were a number of failed 
attempts made to pass legislation that would permit some assisted dying.7 There was also a 
Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, but it too did not end up 
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1 See eg, Samantha Hutchinson, ‘Andrews Victorian Government to Debate Assisted Dying Law Bill’, The 
Australian (online), 25 July 2017 <www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/andrews-victorian-
government-to-debate-assisted-dying-law-bill/news-story/4ef6b947c57efe05daece184c6bba50d>; Death with 
Dignity Bill 2016 (SA); ‘Voluntary Euthanasia Laws Fail to Pass South Australian Parliament by One Vote’, 
Australian Associated Press (online), 16 November 2016 
<www.theguardian.com/society/2016/nov/17/voluntary-euthanasia-laws-clear-hurdle-in-south-australian-
parliament-after-15th-attempt>; Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill 2016 (Tas); ‘Assisted Dying Bill Fails to Pass 
Tasmanian Parliament’, Australian Associated Press (online), 24 May 2017 <www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2017/may/25/assisted-dying-bill-fails-to-pass-tasmanian-parliament>.   
2 This section is a modified extract from my book chapter: Jocelyn Downie, ‘End of Life Law and Policy in 
Canada’ in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben and Erin Nelson (eds) Canadian Health Law and Policy (LexisNexis, 
5th ed, 2017). 
3 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241(b). 
4 Ibid s 229. 
5 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, Sch B Pt 1 ‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’. 
6 Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519. 
7 Jocelyn Downie, ‘Permitting Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Law Reform Pathways for Common 
Law Jurisdictions’ (2016) 16(1) QUT Law Review 84. 
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recommending changes to the law.8 However, for decades, there was strong majority public 
support for the decriminalisation of assisted dying.9 There was also a growing body of evidence 
from permissive regimes demonstrating that the feared slippery slopes had not materialised.10 
Additionally, there were significant new decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada on 
various sections of the Charter (for example, introducing new ‘principles of fundamental 
justice’ and thereby opening up the possibility of new arguments to be made in court that were 
not available at the time of Rodriguez).11 Finally, an Expert Panel of the Royal Society of 
Canada on End of Life Decision-Making recommended the decriminalisation of assisted 
dying.12 
 
B  Three Recent Developments 
 
Against this historical backdrop, dramatic reform came in the shape of three major 
developments. Quebec introduced legislation to regulate medical aid in dying,13 the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that the Criminal Code prohibitions on physician-assisted dying violate 
the Charter,14 and the federal Parliament passed legislation to establish a federal regulatory 
framework for MAiD.15  
 
1  Quebec’s Legislation 
 
The first development hailed from Quebec. On 12 June 2013, following a truly extraordinary 
process of expert and public consultation,16 the Quebec government introduced An Act 
Respecting End-of-life Care (‘the Act’) to allow medical aid in dying.17 After some skirmishes 
in court, the legislation came into force in December 2015.18 The Act establishes a right to 
‘end-of-life care’, defined as ‘palliative care provided to end-of-life patients and medical aid 
                                                 
8 Canada, Senate Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Of Life and Death – Final Report (1995).  
9 See eg, Ipsos News Center, ‘As Dr Kevorkian Released, Just One Quarter (25%) Believe Doctor-Assisted 
Suicide Should Be Illegal’ (Media Release, 10 June 2007) <www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3526>. 
10 See eg, Frances Norwood, Gerrit Kimsma and Margaret P Battin, ‘Vulnerability and the “Slippery Slope” at 
the End-of-Life: a Qualitative Study of Euthanasia, General Practice and Home Death in The Netherlands’ (2009) 
26(6) Family Practice 472; Margaret P Battin et al, ‘Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: the 
Challenge of Empirical Evidence’ (2008) 45 Willamette Law Review 91; Georg Bosshard, Esther Ulrich and 
Walter Bär, ‘748 Cases of Suicide Assisted by a Swiss Right-to-Die Organisation’ (2003) 133 Swiss Medical 
Weekly 310.  
11 Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519. See eg, R v Demers [2004] 2 SCR 489; R 
v Heywood [1994] 3 SCR 761; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney 
General) [2004] 1 SCR 76; R v Malmo-Levine [2003] 3 SCR 571. 
12 Udo Schuklenk et al, ‘The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel: End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (Final Report, 
Royal Society of Canada, November 2011) 6-7 <www.rsc-src.ca/en/expert-panels/rsc-reports/end-life-decision-
making>; concurrently published as ‘End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the Royal Society 
of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (2011) 25(S1) Bioethics 1. 
13 An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001. 
14 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
15 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in 
Dying), SC 2016, c 3, 2411.1. 
16 The consultation included 32 experts, 273 briefs, 239 individuals and organisations at public hearings, 114 
individuals during ‘open mic’ sessions, 6 558 completed online questionnaires, 16 000 comments, 21 meetings 
during a mission in Europe, and 51 deliberative meetings of the Committee. Details are available in Select 
Committee on Dying With Dignity Report (Assemblée National Quebec, March 2012) 12-14 
<www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/CSMD/mandats/Mandat-12989/index.html>.  
17 An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001. 
18 See D’Amico c Québec (Procureure Générale) [2015] QCCS 5556; Quebec (Procureur General) c D’Amico 
[2015] QCCA 2138; ‘Quebec Court of Appeal Rules Assisted Dying Law Can Stand’, CTV News (online), 22 
December 2015 <montreal.ctvnews.ca/quebec-court-of-appeal-rules-assisted-dying-law-can-stand-1.2709907>.  
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in dying’.19 Under the legislation, ‘medical aid in dying’ is defined as: ‘care consisting in the 
administration by a physician of medications or substances to an end-of-life patient, at the 
patient’s request, in order to relieve their suffering by hastening death’.20 
 
The Act permits medical aid in dying for patients who meet all of the following criteria, i.e the 
patient: 
 
(1) is an insured person within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act; 
(2) is of full age and capable of giving consent to care;  
(3) is at the end of life; 
(4) suffers from an incurable serious illness; 
(5) suffers from an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; and 
(6) suffers from constant and unbearable physical or psychological pain which cannot be 
relieved in a manner the person deems tolerable.21 
 
Considerable safeguards are built into the legislation. These include:  
 
• The patients must meet the criteria for access outlined above; 
• The patient must request medical aid in dying themselves, in a free and informed 
manner;22 
• Only physicians may provide medical aid in dying;23 
• Physicians must ensure provision of information, confirmation of conditions being met, 
second independent opinion, and recording of all information;24 
• Physicians must report medical aid in dying;25 
• Institutions must report on continuous palliative sedation and medical aid in dying;26 
• Inspection powers;27 and 
• Oversight by a Commission sur les soins de fin de vie [Commission on end-of-life 
care].28 
 
In an effort to protect access to medical aid in dying and respect conscience, the legislation 
requires: 
 
• Physicians who object to medical aid in dying must report requests for medical aid in 
dying to the executive director (or designate) of their institution (if they work in a 
public institution) or the local authority (if they work in a private facility) or the local 
community centre (if the patient lives somewhere with no local authority). The 
executive director must then find an alternative physician for the patient who has made 
the request.29 
                                                 
19 An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001, s 3(3). 
20 Ibid s 3(6). 
21 Ibid s 26. 
22 Ibid s 26. 
23 Ibid s 30.  
24 Ibid s 29. 
25 Ibid ss 36, 46. 
26 Ibid s 8. 
27 Ibid s 21. 
28 Ibid ss 38–47.  
29 Ibid s 31. 
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• Institutions must offer medical aid in dying unless they offer only palliative care (in 
which case they may opt out).30 
 
Between December 2015 and June 2016, there were 253 requests made for medical aid in dying 
and 166 cases in which it had been administered. Reasons for requests not (yet) resulting in 
administration include: the person did not meet the criteria at the time of making the request 
(27); the person did not meet the criteria during the assessment process or when administration 
was set to take place (9); the person withdrew the request (24); the person died prior to the 
scheduled administration (21); the evaluation was still pending (5); and the person rescheduled 
the administration (1).31 Between June and December 2016, the number of requests for MAiD 
increased to 468 and 295 patients received it; as of 31 December 2016, a total of 461 patients 
were granted MAiD of the 721 who requested it.32 
 
2  Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 
 
The second development was Carter v Canada (Attorney General) (‘Carter’).33 Kay Carter 
was a woman with an extremely painful degenerative condition (spinal stenosis) who decided 
her suffering had become too much; she asked her family to take her to Switzerland for an 
assisted suicide. They did, and they also became the first named plaintiffs in the case that would 
change the law in Canada. Then, Gloria Taylor, a woman with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis  
(‘ALS’) who wanted an assisted death, joined the case and the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association, representing suffering Canadians more generally, effectively carried the case.  
 
The plaintiffs argued that the Criminal Code prohibitions on assisted suicide and voluntary 
euthanasia violate ss 7 and 15 of the Charter.34 The plaintiffs were successful at trial,35 lost the 
appeal (but only on the issue of stare decisis — whether the trial judge was bound by the 1993 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Rodriguez),36 but were then successful again at the 
Supreme Court of Canada,37 which ruled 9–0 that the Criminal Code prohibitions violated the 
Charter and were void. The Supreme Court found that the prohibitions on physician-assisted 
dying38 violated s 7 as they limited the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and were 
                                                 
30 Ibid ss 7, 72. 
31 Pierre Deschamps, ‘Medical Aid in Dying in Quebec: A Status Report’ (Webinar presented to the Canadian Bar 
Association, 23 November 2016).  
32 ‘Over 450 Quebec patients received medical aid in dying last year’, CBC News (online), 14 March 2017: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/medical-assisted-death-cases-first-year-1.4023851>. 
33 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886; Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2013] BCCA 
435; Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331.  
34 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, Sch B Pt 1 ‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ s 7 provides that ‘Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.’ Section 15 provides that ‘Every individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.’ 
35 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886.  
36 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2013] BCCA 435; Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) 
[1993] 3 SCR 519.  The issue of stare decisis is discussed by Smith J in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 
[2012] BCSC 886, [898–910]. 
37 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
38 At trial, Justice Smith defined ‘physician-assisted dying’ and ‘physician-assisted death’ as ‘generic terms that 
encompass physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia that is performed by a medical practitioner or a 
person acting under the direction of a medical practitioner’: [2012] BCSC 886 [39]. She defined ‘physician-
assisted suicide’ as ‘the act of intentionally killing oneself with the assistance of a medical practitioner, or person 
acting under the direction of a medical practitioner, who provides the knowledge, means, or both’: [2012] BCSC 
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overly broad.39 The limit on s 7 rights was not saved by s 1 as the prohibitions did not minimally 
impair the right.40 Therefore, the prohibitions were void: 
 
insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for ‘a competent adult person who (1) clearly 
consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
(including an illness, disease or disability that causes enduring suffering that it intolerable to 
the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition’. ‘Irremediable’, [they added] …, 
does not require the patient to undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.41  
 
The Supreme Court made no comment on whether health care institutions could decline to 
provide physician-assisted dying. The court commented on, but did not resolve the issue of 
conscientiously objecting providers: 
 
In our view, nothing in the declaration of invalidity which we propose to issue would compel 
physicians to provide assistance in dying. The declaration simply renders the criminal 
prohibition invalid. What follows is in the hands of the physicians’ colleges, Parliament, and 
the provincial legislatures. However, we note — as did Beetz J. in addressing the topic of 
physician participation in abortion in Morgentaler — that a physician’s decision to participate 
in assisted dying is a matter of conscience and, in some cases, of religious belief (pp. 95–96). 
In making this observation, we do not wish to pre-empt the legislative and regulatory response 
to this judgment. Rather, we underline that the Charter rights of patients and physicians will 
need to be reconciled.42 
 
The Supreme Court suspended their declaration of invalidity for 12 months (to February 2016) 
to give the government time to craft new legislation should they wish to do so.43 There was a 
federal election after the Carter decision was released and subsequently a change in 
government. When the new Liberal government took office in November 2016, they asked for 
an extension on the suspension of the declaration of invalidity and were given four months (to 
6 June 2016).44 The Supreme Court also made provisions for individuals to be able to access 
physician-assisted dying through the courts during the period of the extension. These cases 
                                                 
886 [37]. She defined ‘euthanasia’ as ‘the intentional termination of the life of a person, by another person, in 
order to relieve the first person’s suffering’: [2012] BCSC 886 [38]. 
39 One principle of fundamental justice under s 7 is overbreadth: ‘restrictions on life, liberty, and security of the 
person must not be more broadly framed than necessary to achieve the legislative purpose’: Carter v Canada 
(Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [1339].  
40 Section 1 of the Charter is a limitation clause as it subjects the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter to 
‘reasonable limits prescribed by law’, that can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. The 
test for s 1 test includes a proportionality analysis, which asks whether the infringement of the right is minimally 
impairing of it. As noted by Justice Smith in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [1232]: ‘The 
question, then, is whether there is an alternative means for the legislature to achieve its objective in a real and 
substantial way that less seriously infringes the Charter rights of Gloria Taylor and others in her situation.’ 
41 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331 [127]. 
42 Ibid [132]. 
43 The government was under no obligation to legislate. It could simply have left the regulation of MAiD consistent 
with the declaration in Carter to the provinces and territories as a matter of health (which is under provincial and 
territorial jurisdiction). Indeed, there is precedent for this approach as the federal government has never passed 
legislation to replace the restrictions on access to abortion struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v 
Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30. Abortion is currently regulated by the provinces and territories as any other health 
service. 
44 ‘Supreme Court Gives Federal Government 4-Month Extension to Pass Assisted Dying Law’, CBC News 
(online), 15 January 2016 <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/assisted-dying-supreme-court-federal-1.3406009>. 
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followed the Carter criteria and there were 17 reported cases of people accessing physician-
assisted dying in that way.45 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately took effect 6 June 2016, and, until the new federal 
legislation was passed (see below), the Criminal Code no longer prohibited physician-assisted 
dying where the Carter criteria were met. 
 
Before moving on to the final development in this area, it is worth returning briefly to the trial 
decision in Carter. In her decision, Justice Lynn Smith made a number of important findings 
of fact (these are important as they were settled at trial and, as is most commonly the case, not 
unsettled by the Supreme Court of Canada). It is important to repeat them here, as they are the 
factual foundation for the current Canadian legal framework for medical assistance in dying. 
 
On palliative care, Justice Smith found: 
 
Adequate palliative care can reduce requests for euthanasia or lead to their retraction.46 
 
However, despite the best possible palliative care, some patients suffer pain that cannot be 
alleviated …. As well, symptoms can cause suffering other than pain (such as nausea, 
vomiting, and shortness of breath) that cannot be alleviated even by the best palliative care.47 
 
Further, high quality palliative care is far from universally available in Canada.48 
 
On ethics, she found: 
 
The preponderance of the evidence from ethicists is that there is no ethical distinction between 
physician-assisted death and other end-of-life practices whose outcome is highly likely to be 
death.49 
 
On the slippery-slope arguments, she found: 
 
[T]he research does not clearly show either a negative or positive impact in permissive 
jurisdictions on the availability of palliative care or the physician-patient relationship.50 
 
No evidence of inordinate impact on vulnerable populations ....51 
 
Risks (eg, re: ability to make well-informed decisions, freedom from coercion or undue 
influence, physicians’ ability to assess patients’ capacity and voluntariness) exist, but they can 
be largely avoided through carefully-designed, well-monitored safeguards.52 
 
A system with properly designed and administered safeguards could, with a very high degree 
of certainty, prevent vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide while 
                                                 
45 See Jocelyn Downie, ‘Court Cases, Judicial Authorizations’, End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada (Health 
Law Institute, Dalhousie University) <eol.law.dal.ca/?page_id=242>. 
46 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [189].  
47 Ibid [190]. 
48 Ibid [192]. 
49 Ibid [335]. 
50 Ibid [9]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid [10]. 
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permitting exceptions for competent, fully informed persons acting voluntarily to receive 
physician-assisted death.53 
 
3  Federal Legislation  
 
As federal, provincial and territorial governments contemplated how to respond to the Carter 
decision, three groups were tasked by various levels of government with studying the question 
of how best to regulate assisted dying: a Federal Expert Panel on Options for a Legislative 
Response to Carter, appointed by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper; a Provincial–Territorial 
Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying; and a Special Joint Committee [of the 
federal House and Senate] on Physician-Assisted Dying. They all issued reports (the latter two 
with recommendations).54 The Provincial–Territorial Expert Advisory Group recommended 
that governments: not have narrower eligibility criteria than those set out in Carter; permit 
access to MAiD for mature minors, individuals whose sole underlying condition is a mental 
illness, and those whose requests were made in advance of loss of capacity; and establish a 
duty to transfer care from conscientiously objecting providers.55 The Special Joint Committee 
issued similar recommendations varying only in recommending a two-year delay in the coming 
into force of the permissive elements regarding mature minors.56 
 
Ultimately the federal government introduced Bill C-14 in April 2016.57 Most notably, the 
government adopted narrower eligibility criteria than those set out in Carter as the Bill did not 
permit access to MAiD for mature minors and requests made in advance of loss of capacity (at 
least not yet); and did not establish a duty to transfer care (although, it must be noted, that lies 
outside their jurisdiction).58 A furious federal parliamentary debate ensued.59 Attempts were 
made through the House of Commons (in Committee and on the floor) to amend the Bill to be 
less restrictive.60 They failed.61 The Senate sent an amended (less restrictive) Bill back to the 
                                                 
53 Ibid [1367]. 
54 External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v Canada, Consultations on Physician-
Assisted Dying: Summary of Results and Key Findings: Final Report (Government of Canada, 2015) 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/pad-amm/index.html>; Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group 
on Physician-Assisted Dying, Final Report (Ontario Department of Health, 2015) 
<www.health.gov.on.ca/en/news/bulletin/2015/docs/eagreport_20151214_en.pdf?>; Special Joint Committee on 
Physician-Assisted Dying, Parliament of Canada, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach 
(2016). 
55 Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 5–11.  
56 Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 21. 
57 Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical 
Assistance in Dying), 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 2016 (first reading as passed by the House of Commons, 14 April 2016) 
<eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/C-14_1.pdf>. 
58 Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces and territories have jurisdiction over the administration of health, 
and regulation of healthcare providers falls within that jurisdiction: Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 1, Sch B 
‘Constitution Act 1982’. 
59 See eg, Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 45 (22 April 
2016), 1005 (Jody Wilson-Raybould); 1035 (Michael Cooper), 1255 (Murray Rankin); see also Vol 148, No 57 
(17 May 2016), No 60 (20 May 2016), No 61 (30 May 2016); Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl, 
1st Sess, Vol 150, No 42 (2 June 2016) 1450 (George Baker), 1650 (Serge Joyal); see also Vol 150, No 41 (1 June 
2016), No 45 (8 June 2016), No 47 (10 June 2016), No 49 (14 June 2016).  
60 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Bill C-14 An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying) (31 May 2016) 
<www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/JUST/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8874111>. 
61 Ibid. 
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House,62 but the House rejected the more permissive amendments.63 Finally the Senate 
conceded and passed the House’s restrictive Bill.64 
 
After its tumultuous ride through the House and Senate, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code 
and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying)65 was passed 
and immediately came into force on 17 June 2016. It is worth repeating that the law as passed 
is narrower than that recommended by the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End of 
Life Decision-Making,66 the Provincial–Territorial Expert Advisory Group, the Special Joint 
Committee, and the amendments sought by the Senate.  
 
The key elements of the federal legislation are as follows: 
 
• Medical assistance in dying is the umbrella term that includes both voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide.67 It is defined in the legislation as: 
(a) the admininstering by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance 
to a person, at their request, that causes their death; or (b) the prescribing or providing 
by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance to a person, at their 
request, so that they may self-administer the substance and in doing so cause their 
own death.68 
• Recognising the scarcity of physicians in Canada (especially in rural and remote 
communities) as well as the competencies and accountability of nurse practitioners, 
both physicians and nurse practitioners are allowed to provide MAiD.69 
• Recognising that health care is provided in teams and few physicians or nurse 
practitioners would be acting completely alone and also recognising that some patients 
would want their loved ones to be the ones to help them at the end, any person is 
permitted to assist the providers. So pharmacists, nurses, and friends and family 
members are all permitted to assist.70 
• Recognising that patients may well ask a whole range of health care providers about 
assisted dying and that these providers could be very appropriate sources of 
information, information can be provided by social workers, psychologists, 
psychiatrists, therapists, medical practitioners, nurse practitioners, and other health 
care professionals.71 
 
According to s 241.2(1) of the new legislation, only those who meet the following criteria can 
have access to medical assistance in dying. Patients must: 
 
                                                 
62 Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical 
Assistance in Dying), 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 2016 (third reading as passed by the Senate 15 June 2016) 
<eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Senate-amendments-sent-to-House.pdf>. 
63 Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 74 (16 June 2016) 1035 
<www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=74&Parl=42&Ses=1&Language=E
&Mode=1>.  
64 Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 52 (17 June 2016) 910 
<sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/chamber/421/debates/052db_2016-06-17-e#16>. 
65 SC 2016, c 3 (‘Medical Assistance in Dying Act’). 
66 Schuklenk et al, above n 12, 6–7. 
67 Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3, s 241.1. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid s 227. 
70 Ibid s 241.  
71 Ibid. 
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• be eligible for health services funded by government in Canada (or would be, but for a 
minimum period of residence or waiting period); 
• be at least 18 years old; 
• be capable of making decisions with respect to their health; 
• have made a voluntary request; 
• have given informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been 
informed of means available to relieve suffering, including palliative care; and 
• have a grievous and irremediable medical condition. 
  
This is further explained in s 241.2(2) as: 
 
• they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; 
• they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; 
• that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical 
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under 
conditions that they consider acceptable; and  
• their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the 
specific length of time that they have remaining. 
 
The following procedural safeguards must also be met: 
 
• A medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must be of the opinion that the person meets 
all of the eligibility criteria;72 
• A request must be made in writing, signed and dated after the patient has been informed 
of their grievous and irremediable condition;73 
• There must be two independent witnesses to the request;74 
• A second independent medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must confirm that the 
eligibility criteria have been met;75 
• There must be a 10-day waiting period between the day the request was signed and the 
day MAiD is provided (unless death or loss of capacity is imminent);76 and 
• The patient must be given the opportunity to withdraw consent and, indeed, must 
explicitly reconfirm the consent required immediately before MAiD is provided.77 
 
Freedom of conscience was, of course, the subject of enormous debate in relation to the 
legislation. Some health care providers want to be able to opt out of MAiD entirely (including 
not providing information, transfers of care, or referrals to willing providers) and some 
institutions want to be able to opt out of allowing MAiD within their walls.78 Patients and 
patient advocates in turn worry about lack of access if opting out is allowed. The legislation 
                                                 
72 Ibid s 241.2(3)(a). 
73 Ibid s 241.2(3)(b). 
74 Ibid s 241.2(3)(c). 
75 Ibid s 241.2(3)(e). 
76 Ibid s 241.2(3)(g). 
77 Ibid s 241.2(3)(h). 
78 A transfer of care and a referral have the same result (a patient gains access to a provider who is willing to 
assess whether she meets the criteria for MAiD and, if so, to provide MAiD). However, some providers believe 
that a referral implies that the provider approves of MAiD while a transfer of care does not and therefore involves 
no (or less) moral compromise on the part of the provider. See Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on 
Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 45. 
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itself does not resolve this conflict as it says only the following: ‘nothing in this Act affects the 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion’;79 and ‘nothing in this section compels an 
individual to provide or assist in providing medical assistance in dying’.80 
 
The legislation also establishes the foundation for retrospective oversight as providers have a 
duty to file information on every written request for MAiD81 (once the conditions for coming 
into force are met), there are penalties for non-compliance with the legislation,82 and there will 
be a Parliamentary review of the provisions of Act and the state of palliative care in Canada, 
scheduled to start on 18 June 2021.83 
 
The legislation also imposes some obligations on the Minister of Health as she must make 
regulations regarding provision, collection, analysis, and reporting of data,84 and, after 
consultation with provinces and territories, she must establish guidelines on information to be 
included on death certificates.85 The legislation also provides that the Ministers of Justice and 
Health must initiate one or more independent reviews of issues relating to mature minors, 
advance requests, and requests where mental illness is the sole underlying condition.86 In 
addition, no more than two years after the initiation of the reviews (ie, by 14 December 2018), 
they must present one or more reports on the reviews to both Houses of Parliament.87 
 
Finally, while not in the legislation itself, the federal government also promised to increase 
support for palliative and end of life care, and to work with the provinces and territories to 
establish a pan-Canadian system for access, a) to facilitate transfers of care; b) to protect the 
conscience of objecting providers; and c) to protect the privacy of willing providers.88  
 
Despite the passage of the federal legislation, there remain some challenges: first, 
implementing the legislation; and, second, dealing with several outstanding legal issues. The 
implementation challenges include: gathering data (eg, standardizing what goes on medical 
certificates of death89 and determining what information needs to be reported and to whom90); 
                                                 
79 Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c3, Preamble. 
80 Ibid s 241.2(9). 
81 Ibid s 241.31(2). 
82 Ibid ss 241.3-4ff. 
83 Ibid s 10. 
84 Ibid s 241.31(3). 
85 Ibid s 241.31(3.1). 
86 Ibid s 9.1(1). These reviews will be conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Council of Canadian 
Academies (the umbrella organisation for the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Academy of Engineering, 
and the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences). Canadian Council of Academics, ‘Council of Canadian 
Academies to Undertake Studies Related to Medical Assistance in Dying’ (What’s New, 14 December 2016) 
<www.scienceadvice.ca/en/news.aspx?id=186>. 
87 Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3, s 91(2). 
88 Department of Justice Canada, ‘Government of Canada Moves Motion to Amend Bill C-14 – Medical 
Assistance in Dying’ (News Release, 16 June 2016) https://www.canada.ca/en/department-
justice/news/2016/06/government-of-canada-moves-motion-to-amend-bill-c-14-medical-assistance-in-
dying.html>. 
89 The Canadian government now has non-binding guidelines for death certificates with respect to MAiD that 
recommend recording both the immediate cause of death (eg toxicity of drugs administered for MAiD) and the 
underlying cause of death (eg ‘the disease or condition that initiated the train of morbid events leading to the 
medically-assisted death’); see ‘Guidelines for Death Certificates’ (online): <www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/services/publications/health-system-services/guidelines-death-certificates.html>. However, 
inconsistencies in practice across Canada remain. 
90 Draft regulations are due this fall. See Government of Canada, 'Interium update on medical assistencing in 
dying in Canada June 17 to December 31, 2016' (31 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/services/publications/health-system-services/medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-dec-2016.html>. 
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establishing MAiD protocols (eg, what drugs, dosages, etc.); ensuring that the most appropriate 
drugs for MAiD are available in Canada;91 determining who pays for the drugs and the services 
of the health care providers; managing the promised system for transfers of care in the face of 
conscientious objections; and educating health care professionals, lawyers, and the public. The 
key outstanding legal issues to be resolved are conscientious objection and the eligibility 
criteria.  
 
Federal, provincial and territorial governments, and regulatory bodies will be challenged to 
clarify whether health care providers have a legal obligation to inform patients about MAiD, 
transfer care to a provider willing to conduct an assessment and provide assistance to a patient 
if eligible, and/or arrange an effective referral to a willing provider. The battlegrounds for these 
issues will be health professional regulatory bodies revising their guidelines and provincial and 
territorial governments deciding whether to introduce legislation to create statutory obligations 
for providers.92 Litigation has already started as the Ontario College of Physicians and 
Surgeons Guidelines establishing a duty of effective referral are being challenged by a 
consortium of religious groups.93 Federal, provincial and territorial governments will also be 
challenged to clarify whether publicly funded health care institutions have a legal duty to 
transfer patients, allow the provision of MAiD within their walls, or provide MAiD. Provincial 
and territorial governments will have to decide whether to insist upon provision by institutions 
(eg, through legislation,94 their memoranda of understanding, or funding agreements). Patients 
may in turn litigate if it turns out that access is being severely hampered by claims of freedom 
of conscience by institutions. It seems increasingly likely that this will be an ongoing and 
growing source of friction as a significant number of institutions appear to be opting out 
without facing any consequences from the provinces or territories.95 
 
The federal Parliament must also deal with outstanding issues concerning the eligibility 
criteria. As noted earlier, Parliament decided to exclude but undertake further study on issues 
                                                 
91 Eg, the preferred drug for self-admininstered MAiD (oral secobarbital) is not available in Canada. See, Sheryl 
Ubelacker, ‘Drugs for Physician-Assisted Death: What Will they Cost and Who Will Pay?’ Canadian Press 
(online), 13 June 2016 <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/drugs-for-physician-assisted-death-what-will-
they-cost-and-who-will-pay/article30414929/>; Health Canada, Drug Product Database <www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
mps/prodpharma/databasdon/index-eng.php>. 
92 See eg, College of Physicians and Surgeons Alberta, Standard of Practice: Medical Assistance in Dying (June 
2016) <www.cpsa.ca/standardspractice/medical-assistance-dying/>; College of Physicians and Surgeons Nova 
Scotia, Professional Standard Regarding Medical Assistance in Dying (2016) <www.cpsns.ns.ca/Standards-
Guidelines/Medical-Assistance-in-Dying>. 
93 See Alex McKeen, 'Doctors challenge Ontario policy on assisted-death referrals', Toronto Star (online), 13 June 
2017 <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/06/13/group-of-doctors-challenge-policy-requiring-referral-to-
services-that-clash-with-morals.html>. The case was heard 13-15 June 2017. A decision has not yet been released. 
Court documents, including the notice of claim by the Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada (CMDS), 
the Canadian Federation of Catholic Physicians’ Societies, Canadian Physicians for Life, and intervor documents 
submitted by Dying with Dignity are available online: <www.dyingwithdignity.ca/cpso_court_challenge>. 
94 For contrasting approaches, see An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001, ss 7, 13, 17; Medical 
Assistance in Dying Statute Law Amendment Act, 2017, SO 2017 C7; and Bill 41, Patients First Act, 2016, SO 
2016 C30;; and Bill 41, Patients First Act, 2016, SO 2016 C30; Local Health System Integration Act, 2006, SO 
2006, c 4, s 20.2(4); Public Hospitals Act, RSO 1990, c P40, s 8.1(2). 
95 See eg, Sharon Kirkey, ‘Ontario Hospitals Allowed to Opt Out of Assisted Dying, Raising Conscientious 
Accommodation Concerns’, National Post (online), 10 June 2016 <news.nationalpost.com/news/ontario-
hospitals-allowed-to-opt-out-of-assisted-dying-raising-conscientious-accommodation-concerns>; Tom 
Blackwell, ‘BC Man Faced Excruciating Transfer After Catholic Hospital Refused Assisted-Death Request’, 
Globe and Mail (online), 27 September 2016 <news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/b-c-man-faced-excruciating-
transfer-after-catholic-hospital-refused-assisted-death-request>. Dying with Dignity Canada has launched a 
campaign to expose barriers that may prevent Canadians from accessing MAiD; see ‘The Shine a Light Campaign’ 
(online): <www.dyingwithdignity.ca/shinealight>.  
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of mature minors and requests made in advance of loss of capacity.96 As required by the 
legislation, between now and December 2018, there are independent reviews of the questions 
of mature minors, advance requests, and mental illness as the sole underlying condition. 
Advocates on all sides of these issues will ultimately  attempt to persuade Parliament to ensure 
that the legislation reflects their positions on these issues.  
 
The Parliament also decided to exclude, with no promise of further study, those whose 
conditions are ‘incurable’, who are in an ‘advanced state of irreversible decline in capability’, 
and whose ‘natural death’ has become ‘reasonably foreseeable’. There will be two kinds of 
challenges to these criteria. First, there will be cases questioning what the key terms or phrases 
mean. For example, in AB v Canada (Attorney General), a woman sought clarification of the 
meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable’.97 Second, there will also be Charter challenges to the 
exclusion criteria. In particular, there will be challenges to the requirements that the patient’s 
condition must be incurable, the patient must be in an advanced state of irreversible decline in 
capability, and their natural death must have become reasonably foreseeable. Recall that the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in one voice, declared the Criminal Code prohibitions on MAiD 
void because they violated the Charter insofar as they prohibited physician-assisted death for: 
 
a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her 
condition. ‘Irremediable’, [they added] …, does not require the patient to undertake treatments 
that are not acceptable to the individual.98  
 
Contrast this with the federal legislation. There is no reference to ‘incurable’ in the Carter case 
declaration. There is no reference to ‘advanced state of irreversible decline in capability’ in the 
Carter declaration. There is no reference to ‘reasonably foreseeable’ in the Carter declaration. 
In sum, the following hypothetical people would be allowed access to MAiD through the 
Carter declaration and, as is already being argued, the Charter would require them to have 
access, but they would be denied access by the legislation: someone who has had three 
unsuccessful rounds of chemo and is refusing a fourth (if her disease is not considered 
incurable);99 someone who had a traumatic injury five years ago (as there is no decline in 
                                                 
96 Individuals whose sole underlying condition is mental illness are not included in this list of excluded groups 
because I am persuaded that, contrary to the assumption of some, the legislation does not exclude them. See 
Jocelyn Downie and Justine Dembo, ‘Medical Assistance in Dying and Mental Illness under the New Canadian 
Law’ (2016) 9 Journal of Ethics in Mental Health VI(iv) 
<http://www.jemh.ca/issues/v9/documents/JEMH_Open-
Volume_Benchmark_Medical_Assistance_in_Dying_and_Mental_Illness_Under_the_New_Canadian_Law-
Nov2016.pdf>, for an argument in support of the position that individuals whose sole condition is a mental illness 
are not excluded from accessing MAiD under the legislation (as long as they meet the s 241.2(2) criteria). There 
is no published rebuttal of this argument. 
97 2017 ONSC 3759. 
98 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331 [127]. 
99 It should be noted here that the Minister of Health and Department of Justice Senior Counsel both stated when 
appearing before the Senate that ‘incurable’ should be interpreted as including the phrase ‘by any means 
acceptable to the patient’: Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 41 (1 June 
2016) 1650 (Dr Jane Philpott)  <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/041db_2016-06-01-e.htm> 
and Evidence to Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Canada 
(6 June 2016) (Chair: Bob Runciman) <www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/52666-E.HTM>. Their 
position is grounded in the well-established right to refuse treatment. However, this phrase is not explicitly 
included the legislation in conjunction with the ‘incurable’ criterion. The phrase is explicitly included in the 
legislation in conjunction with the alleviation of suffering criterion (‘… suffering that is intolerable to them and 
that cannot be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable’). The logic of the defence for not explicitly 
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capability); someone with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (as death is too uncertain); 
someone with Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, multiple sclerosis, or Huntington’s disease (when 
death is too far off); and even someone in Kay Carter’s situation, who is only 60 instead of 89 
(as death is too far off).  
 
One Charter challenge to the new legislation was launched in Lamb v Canada (Attorney 
General)100—by the same legal team that argued and won the Carter case. Julia Lamb is a 25-
year-old woman with spinal muscular atrophy. This is a degenerative muscle-wasting condition 
that is slowly depriving Julia of a wide range of muscular functions and, consequently causing 
considering pain and suffering. She does not wish to access MAiD now, but can anticipate a 
time at which she would find her suffering to be enduring and intolerable; however, her 
physicians would not be able to predict with sufficient certainty that her death is reasonably 
foreseeable. She is arguing that the new federal legislation violates her s 7 and s 15 rights under 
the Charter. This case will focus on Julia and other people who, the Supreme Court of Canada 
said in Carter, must not be prevented from having access to MAiD, but who do not have access 
under the federal legislation.  
 
A second Charter challenge, Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu v Attorney General (Canada) 
and Attorney General (Quebec),101 has been launched arguing that both the federal and Quebec 
laws are too restrictive. Jean Truchon has cerebral palsy, and Nicole Gladu, has post polio 
syndrome. 
 
Governments and practitioners are also going to have to wrestle with the on-the-ground 
consequences of some of the provisions in the federal legislation. These include (but are not 
limited to): 
 
• A patient is in agony from spinal stenosis but refuses pain medication at dosages 
sufficient to control the pain, in order to be competent at the time of the request and at 
the time of provision of MAiD.102  
• A patient has advanced bone cancer pain that can be managed by such deep sedation 
that she is in a semi-conscious state. She has her sedation lightened (and is thereby 
returned to a state of experiencing severe pain) so that she will regain capacity at the 
time of provision of MAiD.103 
• A patient has completed all of the requirements (including the 10-day waiting period) 
on a Friday afternoon, her MAiD provider is not available until Monday, she loses 
capacity on the weekend, and so becomes ineligible for MAiD and remains stranded in 
a state of enduring and intolerable suffering until she dies from her underlying condition 
months later.104  
                                                 
including ‘by any means acceptable to the patient’ for ‘incurable’ would also apply to the alleviation of suffering 
(in which case ‘under conditions that they consider acceptable’ is redundant in s 241.2(2)(c)).  Since the principles 
of statutory interpretation require courts to read legislation in such a way as to avoid redundancy, it might be 
argued that a court would not be permitted to read the limit into s 241.2(2)(a). 
100 Lamb v Canada (Attorney General) (27 June 2016), Vancouver, SCBC, S-165851 (notice of civil claim). 
101 Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu v Attorney General (Canada) and Attorney General (Quebec) (13 June 
2017), Montreal, CQ (Civ Div) (notice of Application to Proceed for Declaratory Relief) filed 13 June 2017, 
online: <www.menardmartinavocats.com/documents/file/demande-introductive-da%C2%80%C2%99instance-
en-jugement-d%C3%83%C2%89claratoire.pdf>. 
102 Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3, ss 241.2(1)(b) and (3)(h). 
103 Ibid s 241.2(3)(h). 
104 Ibid ss 241.2(1)(b) and (3)(h). 
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• A patient was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease three years ago and made an advance 
request for MAiD and, if that wasn’t available, an advance directive refusing all oral 
hydration and nutrition once she reached stage seven of the disease. She is now stage 
seven, incapable and therefore ineligible for MAiD, and so the institution stops giving 
her food and liquids and waits while she dies of dehydration.105  
• A patient has multiple sclerosis but, although experiencing enduring and intolerable 
suffering, her death is not reasonably foreseeable. She decides to stop eating and reduce 
liquids in order to get close enough to death to qualify for MAiD while still retaining 
capacity. It takes 50 days without food and four days without liquid before her 
physician determines that she meets the eligibility criteria.106  
• A patient has Huntington’s disease and while experiencing enduring and intolerable 
suffering, her death is not likely for a number of years. She asks her physician to provide 
her with deep and continuous sedation and she refuses artificial hydration and nutrition. 
She dies 14 days later.107  
 
As the public continues to learn of these situations that result from the way in which the 
legislation has been drafted, there is likely to be increased pressure on governments to revisit 
the provisions that create such situations and on providers to find ways to avoid the 
consequences while respecting the provisions.108  
 
Finally, the inconsistencies between the Quebec legislation, the Carter decision, and the federal 
legislation will need to be addressed. For example, the Quebec legislation requires that patients 
be ‘at the end of life’, which is a much narrower criterion than Carter’s criterion of ‘grievous 
and irremediable condition’. The federal legislation also requires a 10-day waiting period 
between the request and the provision of MAiD while the Quebec legislation does not.109 
 
III  LESSONS FOR AUSTRALIA 
 
What then can Australia learn from the Canadian experience with decriminalising medical 
assistance in dying? First, be patient and adaptable. In Canada, advocates of law reform 
concurrently worked on litigation, legislation, and prosecutorial charging guidelines.110 They 
wanted to be able to go through any crack in any window of opportunity that opened. If one 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid ss 241.2(1)(b) and (2)(d). 
107 Ibid.  
108 Eg, could impending provision of palliative sedation be taken to mean that loss of capacity is imminent and 
therefore a shortening of the 10-day waiting period is permissible? Could all patients with diagnoses involving 
future dementia who want MAiD be advised to explicitly refuse oral feeding and liquids through advance 
directives?  
109 Rather, the Quebec legislation requires at s 29(1)(c) ‘verifying the persistence of suffering and that the wish to 
obtain medical aid in dying remains unchanged, by talking with the patient at reasonably spaced intervals given 
the progress of the patient’s condition’. The Deputy Minister of Health of Quebec instructed health care 
institutions to comply with the 10 day requirement. However, the Executive Director of the Conseil pour la 
Protection des Malades has filed a complaint with the Quebec Ombudsperson about this instruction. See Aaron 
Derfel, ‘Dying with Dignity: Quebec Paves Way, but Critics Point to Problems’ Montreal Gazette (online), 21 
October 2016 <montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/medial-aid-in-dying-quebecs-experience>; Isabelle Paré, 
‘Six Ordres Professionnels Demandent un Appel sur L’aide à Mourir’, Le Devoir (online), 6 December 2016 
<www.ledevoir.com/societe/sante/486444/aide-a-mourir-six-ordres-professionnels-demandent-un-renvoi-en-
cour-d-appel>.  
110 See eg, Jocelyn Downie and Simone Bern, ‘Rodriguez Redux’ (2008) 16 Health Law Journal 27, 44–54; 
Jocelyn Downie and Ben White, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion in Assisted Dying in Canada: A Proposal for Charging 
Guidelines’ (2012) 6(2) McGill Journal of Law and Health 113.  
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waits for the window to open before developing the arguments, drafting legislation, etc, then 
by the time the work is done, the window will have closed again. So the advocates prepared 
for all eventualities, were patient, and then took the litigation path when it opened and the 
legislation path when that followed. 
 
Second, prepare the foundations for law reform initiatives. It was essential to the plaintiffs’ 
success in the Carter case that they were able to access robust empirical evidence on the 
experience with assisted dying around the world111 as well as well-developed legal and ethical 
arguments on why assisted dying should be decriminalised.112 Very clear strong public support 
for both the Carter decision and assisted dying were also important for the legislative 
process.113 
 
Third, consult and engage broadly. As noted earlier in this paper, this principle was embraced 
by the Quebec Select Committee on Dying with Dignity and is in no small part a reason for the 
widespread support for their medical aid in dying legislation. It was also respected (albeit on 
an abridged timeline) by the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-
Assisted Dying and the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying and, again, 
probably played a role in the strong positive response their reports received from the majority 
of Canadians. However, the perils of not consulting were also manifest in the Canadian process. 
For example, the Canadian government did not consult with the regulators of physicians, but 
rather just consulted with the Canadian Medical Association.114 If they had consulted with 
those who are tasked with regulating physicians, they would have been advised not to use the 
criterion that ‘natural death’ be ‘reasonably foreseeable’115 and, had they followed that advice, 
                                                 
111 See eg, the impact of the expert evidence provided by Johannes J M van Delden, Luc Deliens, and Linda 
Ganzini in the trial decision in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886. 
112 See eg, Jocelyn Downie, Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2004); Downie and Bern, above n 110. See also the impact of the expert 
evidence provided by Wayne Sumner, Margaret Pabst Battin, and Marcia Angell in the trial decision in Carter v 
Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886. 
113 See eg, results of Ipsos Poll: Ipsos Public Affairs, Dying with Dignity Canada, (February 2016), 
<d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/dwdcanada/pages/480/attachments/original/1455165944/DWDC-Ipsos_-
_Feb_2016_poll_-_final.pdf?1455165944>.  
114 Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Canada, Proceedings, 
Issue No 9, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (10 May 2016) <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/421/lcjc/09ev-
52575-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=42&Ses=1&comm_id=11>. Senator Joyal asked the Federation of Medical 
Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC) whether or not they had been consulted on Bill C-14 and FMRAC 
said they had not. Likewise the same question directed to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
revealed they had not been consulted. FMRAC is mandated ‘to advance medical regulation on behalf of the public 
through collaboration, common standards and best practices’: see FMRAC, Mission <fmrac.ca/about-us/>. The 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is ‘a national association of physicians that advocates on behalf of its 
members and the public for access to high-quality health care’ and ‘provides leadership and guidance to 
physicians’: see CMA, History, Mission, Vision and Values <www.cma.ca/En/Pages/history-mission-
vision.aspx>. The CMA had historically been opposed to MAiD and so, despite the fact that the official position 
had become neutral on decriminalisation (see CMA, CMA Policy: Euthanasia and Assisted Death: Update 2014 
<www.cma.ca/En/Pages/end-of-life.aspx> 3), it came as no surprise that they were actively lobbying in support 
of a restrictive approach to the eligibility criteria.  
115 See Evidence to Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Canada, 
42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Issue No 9, 10 May 2016, 9:47, (Dr Douglas Grant) 
<sencanada.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/421/lcjc/pdf/09issue.pdf>, where FMRAC rejects ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ and ‘natural death’; FMRAC, ‘Bill C-14, Medical Assistance in Dying: Submission to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ (What’s New, 10 May 2016) <fmrac.ca/federation-of-
medical-regulatory-authorities-of-canada-bill-c-14-medical-assistance-in-dying/>. 
QUT Law Review Volume 17 (1) – General Issue 
QUT Law Review 17 (1), October 2017 | 142 
 
they would have avoided the firestorm that greeted their draft legislation and the Charter 
challenge to the legislation that has now been commenced.116  
 
It is also essential to be respectful of heterogeneity in communities. The loudest voice does not 
necessarily articulate the most widely held or only held position. A good example of this 
phenomenon in Canada is with respect to persons with disabilities. There was a very vocal 
group representing persons with disabilities and arguing for as restrictive an approach as 
possible.117 Yet there are many other people with disabilities who believe that the most 
restrictive approach is patronising, paternalistic, and infantilising.118  
 
Remember also to consult with indigenous communities. In Canada, indigenous communities 
lack access to health services, are confronting a higher rate of suicide than non-indigenous 
populations, and have a range of different cultural values and beliefs relevant to end of life 
decision-making.119 In Canada, they were not adequately engaged in the conversations about 
decriminalisation and implementation of MAiD.120 As a result, policy-makers and providers 
are now playing catch-up and trying to undo misinformation and mistrust. 
 
Fourth, prepare the infrastructure for assisted dying. It is essential to develop a mechanism 
for identifying willing providers, as providers can feel at risk of stigmatisation by their 
colleagues and attack from opponents of assisted dying, and so may not make their willingness 
known. But, in order to ensure access for patients, it is essential to know who and where the 
willing providers are. Some physicians in Canada have been very open about being willing 
                                                 
116 Lamb v Canada (Attorney General) (27 June 2016), Vancouver, SCBC, S-165851 (notice of civil claim). 
117 Vulnerable Person Standard, Materials Related to Bill C-14 <www.vps-npv.ca/materials-related-to-bill-c14/>; 
Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, Issue No 9, Evidence, 42nd 
Parl, 1st Sess (10 May 2016) (Michael Bach) <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/421/lcjc/09ev-52575-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=42&Ses=1&comm_id=11>; Evidence to Senate Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights, Parliament of Canada, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 12, 3 May 2016, 1950 (Michael Bach); and 42nd Parl, 
1st Sess, No 13 (4 May 2016) 1800 (Dianne Pothier); Dianne Pothier, Submissions to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Consideration of Bill C-14, 28 April 2016, <www.vps-
npv.ca/s/Pothier-Senate-Committee-submissions-on-C-14.pdf>; Senate Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights, Parliament of Canada, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 5 May 2016, (David Baker) 
<sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/committee/421/lcjc/52552-e>.  
118 Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 June 2016, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, Vol 150, Issue 43 (Chantal Petitclerc) 
1100: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/043db_2016-06-03-e.htm>; Senate Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 12, (3 May 2016) 1715 (Angus Gunn); 
Carter v Canada [2015] 1 SCR 331 (Factum of the Intervenor the Alliance of People with Disabilities who are 
Supportive of Legal Assisted Dying Society) <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/35591/FM130_Intervener_Alliance-of-People-with-Disabilities.pdf>. 
119 For access to health services, see Jeff Reading and Regine Halseth, Pathways to Improving Well-Being for 
Indigenous Peoples: How Living Conditions Decide Health (National Collaborating Centre for Aboriginal Health, 
2013) <www.nccah-ccnsa.ca/Publications/Lists/Publications/Attachments/102/pathways_EN_web.pdf>; for 
suicide, see Sherry Bellamy and Cindy Hardy, Understanding Depression in Aboriginal Communities and 
Families (National Collaborating Centre for Aboriginal Health, 2015) <www.nccah-
ccnsa.ca/Publications/Lists/Publications/Attachments/150/2015-10-07-RPT-MentalHealth03-Depression-
BellamyHardy-EN-Web.pdf>; for cultural beliefs and values, see Elaine Anselmi, ‘Physician Assisted Dying: 
Offering a Choice Means Making Tough Decisions’, Northern Public Affairs (online), 22 February 2016 
<www.northernpublicaffairs.ca/index/physician-assisted-dying-offering-a-choice-means-making-tough-
decisions/>. 
120 There was some engagement, but no community consultation. See eg, House of Commons Special Joint 
Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, Parliament of Canada, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 9 (1 February 
2016) 1715 (Dr Carrie Bourassa); No 10 (2 February 2016) 1900 (Dr. Alika Lafontaine). Alika Lafontaine, Carrie 
Bourassa and Melanie MacKinnon engaged with the Federal Expert Panel.  
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providers.121 Some provinces and territories have set up a central team that can be contacted 
by patients.122 Access is further enhanced if some entity capable of protecting provider privacy 
is given the mandate and resources necessary to act as a go-between to ensure patients have 
access to willing providers.123 It is also essential to develop a transfer of care system if any 
conscientious objection by providers and/or publicly funded health care institutions will be 
permitted. Many provinces and territories in Canada have set up such systems and as a result 
some patients can access MAiD even when their own health care providers object to it.124  
 
It is also necessary to make sure the most appropriate drugs are licensed. It was only realised 
after the fact that secobarbital (the drug preferred by Canadian providers, for self-administered 
MAiD) is not available in Canada, so patients who wish to self-administer may face real 
barriers to doing so (for example, an oral protocol is available in Alberta but not in Nova 
Scotia).125 Australian patients could find themselves in the same bind if the barriers to access 
to secobarbital (or pentobarbital which may be preferred in Australia) are not removed when 
or before MAiD is decriminalised. 
 
It is also important to establish educational programs for health professionals, lawyers, and the 
public. Everyone needs to understand what the law is and what their rights and obligations are, 
and providers need to know how to deliver MAiD. Support systems must also have been put 
in place for providers as well as patients and families. Canada is playing catch-up on both of 
these infrastructure pieces—MAiD is legal but not everybody has the information or support 
they need.126  
 
It is also essential to establish the infrastructure for the oversight system: for the sake of 
accountability, transparency and trust, all cases should be reviewed; and death certificate forms 
                                                 
121 See eg, Elizabeth Church, ‘Ellen Wiebe is the Doctor Seeking a Smoother Path to Assisted Death’, Globe and 
Mail (online), 2 March 2016  <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ellen-wiebe-is-the-doctor-seeking-a-
smoother-path-to-assisted-death/article29006968/>; Shannon Proudfoot, ‘Q&A: Stefanie Green on Helping 
Doctors Navigate Assisted Dying’, Maclean’s (online), 25 November 2016 <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/qa-
stefanie-green-on-helping-doctors-navigate-assisted-dying/>; Sandra Martin, ‘Patients Should Talk Frankly With 
their Doctors about Assisted Dying’, Globe and Mail (online), 12 November 2015 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/health/patients-should-talk-frankly-with-their-doctors-
about-assisted-dying/article27234624/>.  
122 See eg, Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Accessing Medical Assistance in Dying (2016) 
<www.wrha.mb.ca/maid/contact.html>. 
123 See eg, Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying Care Coordination Services (14 July 2016) 
<www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/hp/maid/if-hp-maid-coordination-service.pdf>; Nova Scotia Health 
Authority, Medical Assistance in Dying: Frequently Asked Questions for the Public (4 July 2016) 
<www.nshealth.ca/sites/nshealth.ca/files/faq_for_public_2016_07_04.pdf>. 
124 Nova Scotia Health Authority, above n 123; Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying: Frequently 
Asked Questions for Patients and Family Members <www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/pf/if-pf-maid-faqs-
public.pdf>.  
125 The Health Canada Drug Product database shows no results for secobarbital, indicating its licence has lapsed. 
Health Canada, Drug Product Database <https://health-products.canada.ca/dpd-bdpp/index-eng.jsp>. This drug 
was cancelled post-market in 2004. Janet French, ‘Nearly 80 Alberta Doctors Have Stepped Forward to Offer 
Physician-Assisted Death’ Edmonton Sun (online) 13 March 2016 <www.edmontonsun.com/2016/03/13/nealy-
80-alberta-doctors-have-stepped-forward-to-offer-euthanasia-physician-assisted-death>; Alberta Health 
Services, above n 124; Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying — Phase Four Action Phase (26 
August 2016) <www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/hp/maid/if-hp-maid-process-admin-medication.pdf>.  
126 One group filling this void is the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers, 
<http://camapcanada.ca/>. It has been set up by a small group of MAiD providers on a voluntary mutual-assistance 
basis. It would have been better if such an organisation could have been set up prior to the coming into force of 
the legislation and with sufficient government support to enable it to play a robust role in education and support 
from the outset. 
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need to be modified and instructions given on the completion of death certificates (what is the 
manner of death, the underlying cause of death, etc).127 These steps enable robust data 
gathering, analysis and reporting, which again is essential for accountability and transparency, 
and having and deserving the trust of the public. They also enable research to be conducted on 
a range of issues aimed at improving end of life care. Unfortunately, Canada did not get its 
oversight infrastructure in place prior to the legalisation of MAiD. Indeed, more than a year 
after the legislation came into force, there is no pan-Canadian oversight system; there is 
considerable variability with respect to who is conducting case reviews (where any case review 
is being done), and there is no standard approach to what information is being reported and to 
whom. Even the death certificate forms and instructions are not consistent across the 
country.128  
 
More positive lessons can be learned from other permissive jurisdictions, for example, the 
Netherlands and Belgium have robust systems for reviewing and reporting on all cases and the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the permissive American states all gather and report on robust data 
sets.129 The Netherlands also commissions a major end of life decision-making research study 
every five years rather than (as in Belgium) leaving this to researchers to find their own funding 
independently (and therefore somewhat irregularly).130 However, nobody yet has developed a 
system that gathers reliable data on all requests (which can provide important evidence on a 
variety of issues such as patient access) or that facilitates research in an efficient, reliable, and 
cost-effective manner (eg, by linking MAiD cases through death certificates with large health 
information databases). Again, while these issues were flagged for the Canadian authorities, 
they did not get out ahead of them and so we are in a sense building the ship while sailing it—
and this is definitely not ideal. 
 
Fifth, beware of negative consequences that can accompany particular turns of phrase in 
legislative drafting and particular positions taken on substantive issues in the debate about 
criteria for access and procedural safeguards. In particular, as illustrated earlier, there are 
serious negative consequences flowing from the following elements of the Canadian 
                                                 
127 Jocelyn Downie and Kacie Oliver, ‘Medical Certificates of Death: First Principles and Established Practices 
Provide Answers to New Questions’ (2015) 188(1) Canadian Medical Association Journal 49. 
128 Eg, until Ontario passed Bill 84 (above n 94), coroners in Ontario completed the medical certificates of death 
for MAiD cases and they are instructed to report ‘combined drug toxicity’ as the cause of death with reference to 
the underlying medical condition that qualified the person for MAiD and with ‘suicide’ as the manner of death 
(with reference to MAiD): the attending physician now prescribes what is written on the medical certificate of 
death; e-mail communication from Cheryl Mahyr, Issues Manager, Office of the Chief Coroner of Ontario 
Forensic Pathology Service, 31 January 2017 and 14 August 2017. Providers in Nova Scotia are being instructed 
to report the drugs as the immediate cause, the grievous and irremediable condition as the underlying cause, and 
whatever would have been recorded as the manner of death had the person died from the grievous and irremediable 
condition.  MAiD is also noted at the bottom of the form: telephone communication from Krista Dewey, Deputy 
Registrar General, Nova Scotia. 
129 Eg, information for the Netherlands is available at Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthansie, Frequently 
Asked Questions <www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/uitspraken/publicaties/faq-engels/faq/faq/frequently-asked-
questions>; section 5 of the Belgian Euthanasia Act requires physicians to complete Federal Control and 
Evaluation Commission form (Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002 <eol.law.dal.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Euthanasia-Act.pdf>; Oregon State publishes annual dying with dignity reports: see 
Oregon Health Authority, Annual Reports 
<public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/ar-
index.aspx>; Washington State also publishes data: see Washington State Department of Health, Death with 
Dignity Data 
<www.doh.wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/IllnessandDisease/DeathwithDignityAct/DeathwithDignityData>. 
130 A van der Heide et al, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands over 25 Years’ (2017) 377(5) New England 
Journal of Medicine 492, doi: 10.1056/NEJMc1705630. 
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legislation: capacity required at time of provision; mandatory waiting periods; access limited 
to those for whom death is ‘reasonably foreseeable’;131 and allowing providers and institutions 
to opt out. This is not to say that legislators must avoid all of these elements (although I would 
argue for that). Rather, it is to say that legislators must be aware of the consequences of 
proceeding with those elements. It might be argued that the Canadian government did not know 
and therefore should not be blamed for the consequences of their legislative drafting. However, 
any jurisdiction that follows Canada will have been forewarned and will therefore bear the 
responsibility for the suffering that ensues. 
 
Sixth, take the opportunity of assisted dying being on the legislative agenda to also address 
related end of life issues. The Canadian legislation only deals with MAiD, so it did not resolve 
the following issues: unilateral withholding or withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining 
treatment (can a physician withhold or withdraw potentially life-sustaining treatment without 
the knowledge of or against the wishes of the patient or patient’s substitute decision-
maker?);132 palliative sedation (can you provide deep and continuous sedation and respect a 
refusal of artificial hydration and nutrition for a patient with a neurodegenerative condition 
who is not expected to die for years but whose suffering has become enduring and 
intolerable?);133 and voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (can patients stop eating and 
drinking until death and can they refuse not only artificial hydration and nutrition but also oral 
feeding through an advance directive?).134 End of life decision-making is best seen as a 
spectrum of care and countries should have clear laws about the entire spectrum so that they 
can care best for all patients at the end of life. Canada does not. Australia does not. Yet both 
countries can and should. 
 
The final lesson to be drawn from the Canadian experience is that the hard work that it takes 
to decriminalise MAiD is worth it. Approximately 970 people have been able to access MAiD 
as of 31 December 2016.135 Some (a much larger number) will have made a request for MAiD 
and qualified, but never self-administered or had a physician or nurse practitioner admininster 
it. An unknown number (but still higher) have been comforted to know that MAiD would or 
will be available to them, should, or when, they reach the point of enduring and intolerable 
suffering. Still others (a much, much larger number) will never have made a request but will 
                                                 
131 This lesson is immediately relevant to the Australian context as drafts of legislation in different states have 
relied upon variations on the criterion of ‘terminal illness’. If this criterion is defined in terms of a life expectancy 
rather than lethality of the condition, the legislation will likely generate the same negative consequence as has 
accompanied the Canadian criterion of ‘reasonably foreseeable’ (ie, patients starving themselves to get close 
enough to death to qualify).  
132 Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Jocelyn Downie, ‘Withholding and Withdrawal of “Futile” Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: Unilateral Medical Decision-Making in Australia and New Zealand’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 907. 
133 Jocelyn Downie, ‘And Miles to Go Before I Sleep: The Future of End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada’ 
(2016) 39 Dalhousie Law Journal 413. 
134 Thaddeus Pope and Lindsey Anderson, ‘Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Legal Treatment Option 
at the End of Life’ (2011) 17 Widener Law Review 363; Thaddeus Pople and Amanda West, ‘Legal Briefing: 
Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking’ (2014) 25(1) Journal of Clinical Ethics 68; Nataša Ivanović, Daniel 
Büche and André Fringer, ‘Voluntary Stopping of Eating and Drinking at the End of Life – a “Systematic Search 
and Review” Giving Insight into an Option of Hastening Death in Capacitated Adults at the End of Life’ (2014) 
13(1) BMC Palliative Care 1. 
135 Government of Canada, 'Interium update on medical assistencing in dying in Canada June 17 to December 31, 
2016' (31 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/health-system-
services/medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-dec-2016.html>. The most regular, up-to-date, and 
comprehensive (within a province) data are available on the Alberta MAiD website: Alberta Health Services, 
Medical Assistance in Dying: Data <www.albertahealthservices.ca/info/Page14930.aspx>. 
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have been relieved just to know that the option would be there for them to pursue should their 
suffering ever become enduring and intolerable. 
  
Obviously much still remains to be done in Canada. But these are at least some of the lessons 
that can be learned so far. My hope is that Australian states can take the good, leave the bad, 
and thereby profoundly enhance end of life care in Australia. 
